

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJC TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: STOESSEL STATEMENT AT PLENARY
MEETING, JULY 24, 1975 - TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 73

1. FOLLOWING IS STOESSEL STATEMENT AT JULY 24 PLENARY

MEETING:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. MINISTER:

WE LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO DR. BEZUMOV'S PRESENTATION
ON THE TECHNICAL METHOD PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE FOR THE
DETERMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL YIELDS OF THE EXPLOSIONS IN A
GROUP.

THIS TECHNICAL METHOD RESTS ON THE SAME BASIC PRINCIPLES
AS DOES THE SLIFER METHOD PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE. ALTHOUGH
WE HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO STUDY THIS ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUE,
AND DR. BEZUMOV DID NOT DESCRIBE THE SPECIFIC INSTRUMENT
DESIGN, IT IS OUR IMMEDIATE IMPRESSION THAT THE CONCEPT IS
SOUND.

BOTH METHODS MEASURE THE POSITION OF THE SHOCK FRONT
AS A FUNCTION OF TIME IN THE HYDRODYNAMIC ZONE AROUND
THE EXPLOSION. FROM THE ENSEMBLE OF MEASUREMENTS OF
SHOCK RADIUS VERSUS TIME AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF YIELD
CAN BE OBTAINED; AND THIS IS THE MOST ACCURATE OF THE

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VARIOUS WAYS TO DETERMINE YEILDS THAT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED

IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

WE SUBSCRIBE TO YOUR REMARK, MR. MINISTER, MADE ON JULY 21, THAT THE MOST ACCURATE MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE SHOULD BE USED IN VERIFICATION OF GROUP EXPLOSIONS.

ACCURACY OF MEASUREMENT IS NOT, OF COURSE, THE SOLE CRITERION THAT NEEDS TO BE INVOKED IN OUR CONSIDERATIONS. OUR INTEREST IS NOT IN TECHNICAL MEASUREMENTS FOR SCIENTIFIC REASONS, BUT RATHER FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IMPOSES OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN ADDITION TO ACCURACY.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE MEASUREMENTS MUST BE TO PROVIDE THE VERIFYING SIDE A SET OF DATA WHICH IS OBTAINED INDEPENDENTLY AND IS FREE FROM POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE BY THE HOST PARTY -- ACCIDENTAL OR DELIBERATE.

FURTHER, THE METHOD MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT.

AT THE BEGINNING OF ROUND II, THE US SIDE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE MOST DIRECT AND TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF VERIFYING GROUP EXPLOSIONS WAS TO REQUIRE THAT EXPLOSIVES IN A GROUP BE FIRED SEQUENTIALLY; THAT IS, THAT EACH EXPLOSION BE FIRED WITH A MINIMUM TIME SEPARATION FROM THE PRECEDING EXPLOSION SO THAT EACH EXPLOSION COULD BE DISTINGUISHED AND ITS YIELD DETERMINED BY TELESEISMIC MEANS.

WE DID NOT THEN SEE ANY OTHER WAY TO SATISFY READILY THE REQUIREMENTS OF ACCURACY, INDEPENDENT MEASUREMENTS, AND NON-INTERFERENCE WITH THE PROJECT BY ANOTHER APPROACH.

IT WAS THE SOVIET VIEW THAT SEQUENTIAL FIRING OF EXPLOSIONS TO SATISFY TELESEISMIC REQUIREMENTS OF YIELD DETERMINATION WAS NOT A SATISFACTORY APPROACH TO THE SECRET

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CONDUCT OF GROUP EXPLOSIONS.

IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET VIEW, THE US SIDE UNDERTOOK A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO VERIFY GROUP EXPLOSIONS. AS A RESULT OF THAT ANALYSIS, WE CONCLUDED THAT, IF APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES WERE ADOPTED, THE SLIFER METHOD DID OFFER A MEANS WHEREBY NEARLY-SIMULTANEOUS GROUP EXPLOSIONS WITH AN AGGREGATE

YIELD IN EXCESS OF AN AGREED INDIVIDUAL THRESHOLD COULD BE PERMITTED WITH ASSURANCE OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

THE US SIDE HAS DESCRIBED THE NECESSARY PROCEDURES FOR USE OF SLIFERS BOTH IN EXPERTS' MEETINGS AND IN PLENARY. THESE PROCEDURES WOULD INSURE THAT RELIABLE INDEPENDENT DATA WOULD BE OBTAINED, AND THE EQUIPMENT AND DATA GATHERING WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT. THESE PROCEDURES WOULD ALSO APPLY IF THE SOVIET SIDE CHOSE TO USE THE DISCRETE METHOD FOR VERIFYING GROUP EXPLOSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE US.

IN CONTRAST TO THE US POSITION, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE VERIFYING SIDE SHOULD RELY ON DATA OBTAINED FROM INSTRUMENTS DESIGNED, MANUFACTURED, INSTALLED AND OPERATED BY THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION. THIS APPROACH WOULD NOT PROVIDE TO THE VERIFYING SIDE AN INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF THE YIELDS OF THE EXPLOSIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY THIS APPROACH WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE VERIFICATION.

THIS APPROACH, SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE US SIDE.

THE US POSITION WHICH WOULD PERMIT NEARLY-SIMULTANEOUS GROUP EXPLOSIONS WHERE AGGREGATE YIELD IS IN EXCESS OF AN AGREED INDIVIDUAL YIELD LIMIT RESTS ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROCEDURES FOR VERIFYING INDIVIDUAL YIELDS THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BASED ITS SUGGESTION, IN PART, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE VERIFYING SIDE COULD OBTAIN
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DATA NOT NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION IF MEASUREMENTS ARE OBTAINED FROM INSTRUMENTS DESIGNED, MANUFACTURED AND OPERATED BY THE VERIFYING SIDE.

IN THIS REGARD, WE POINT OUT AGAIN THAT OBSERVERS WILL HAVE ACCESS ONLY TO RECORDED DATA. THE HOST PARTY WILL HAVE THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ENTIRE INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE RECORDING INSTRUMENTS, AND WILL KNOW THE CAPABILITIES OF THIS EQUIPMENT IN DETAIL.

THE HOST PARTY WILL BE ABLE TO EXAMINE THE EQUIPMENT BROUGHT TO THE SITE BY THE VERIFYING SIDE AND CAN CONFIRM THAT THE RECORDING INSTRUMENTS CONFORM TO THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS, AND CONTAIN NO ADDITIONAL

FEATURES.

IF, IN ADDITION TO THESE PROVISIONS, THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT SPECIAL ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ARE NEEDED TO PREVENT THE RECORDING OF DATA WHICH IT REGARDS AS INAPPROPRIATE, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THEM.

THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO MENTIONED CONCERNS ABOUT ANY EQUIPMENT NOT DESIGNED, MANUFACTURED AND OPERATED BY THE HOST SIDE BEING PLACED NEAR THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CANNISTER; BUT DID NOT DESCRIBE ANY SPECIFIC REASONS FOR THIS CONCERN. WE MENTION AGAIN THAT, IN THE US PROPOSAL, THE INSTRUMENT SYSTEM WOULD BE INSTALLED BY THE HOST SIDE UNDER THE OBSERVATION OF PERSONNEL OF THE VERIFYING SIDE. THE US SIDE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT UNDER THE PROCEDURES WE PROPOSE THE USE OF SLIFERS, OR THEIR EQUIVALENT, DESIGNED, MANUFACTURED, AND OPERATED BY PERSONNEL OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR VERIFICATION OF YIELDS IN GROUP EXPLOSIONS CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES.

END TEXT.
STOESSEL

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